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Clausewitzian Trinity

Foundational Military Strategy
Clausewitzian Trinity is a term used in discussions of military strategy, and even geo-political strategy, whose basis is the unfinished, but seminal treatise On War by the Prussian military philosopher General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Clausewitz is referred to by some as the millennium's preeminent strategist and his work On War is widely considered to be the Western peer, but not necessarily the equal, of the ancient Chinese war philosopher Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Read by Eisenhower, Kissinger, Patton, Mao and most great modern military and business strategists, Clausewitz’s and Sun Tsu’s works are foundational studies in war colleges around the world.

Clausewitz’s introduction of systematic philosophical thought into Western military instruction and operational planning is embodied in what has come to be called the “Clausewitzian Trinity”. In On War (page 89) Clausewitz describes this trinity:

"As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity--composed (1) of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; (2) of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and (3) of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone."

Some have shortened the Clausewitzian Trinity to the three single words: emotion, chance, and policy.

Clausewitz correlates each of these forces to one of three sets of human actors (his “social trinity”) – the people, the army, and the government – each of which is associated “mainly” with war’s three components, in the order listed. However, Clausewitzian does not equate the social trinity to the larger “categories of forces” we call the Clausewitzian Trinity, which are larger and more powerful forces at work.

West Point and Army War College instructors Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, writing in Parameters, the Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995 (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Trinity/TRININTR.htm), describe the Clausewitzian Trinity as one of the Clausewitzian concepts most frequently cited in all of recent military literature.

After the Vietnam and first Gulf War experiences, in two influential studies, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982) and On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (1995), Col. Harry Summers moves away from the classical Clausewitzian Trinity and emphasizes the Clausewitzian-correlated "people, army, and government” as the essential trinity for military operations.

Other authors including Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), dismiss the Clausewitzian Trinity as largely irrelevant to nonpolitical wars against non-state opponents like terrorists.

Nevertheless, as illustration of the continuing validity of the Clausewitzian Trinity in considerations of military strategy, Villacres and Bassford point out, “Clausewitz saw his theory as a basis for study, not as doctrine.”

The term Clausewitzian friction refers to Clausewitz’s theory that reality exerts a kind of friction on ideas and intentions in war. This term is commonly associated with the diverse difficulties and impediments to the effective use of military force, as cited in Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Diane Publishing, 1996, and National Defense University, 2004).

The general term “Clausewitzian” is also tossed around casually as in Clausewitzian thought, Clausewitzian perspective, and even inappropriately in the phrases Clausewitzian buffer and Clausewitzian humor.

posted by DanZ @ 1:00 PM